If it moves, Kerberize It!

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Overview

• Informatics Background & Motivation
• Case studies - political & technical
  • OpenSSH,
  • Thunderbird,
  • Jabber
• Summary of issues encountered
• Questions ...
Informatics@Edinburgh

• ~2000 hosts, ~4500 users
• 5 years of production Kerberos use
• Distributed, highly integrated environment
• Decreed that key applications must have Kerberos support before, or early on in roll-out
Why bother?

- Usability - “The fax effect”
- Security - reduces passwords in cleartext and cached locally
Open Source Kerberos

• Historically varied quality and degree of Kerberos support

• We’ve put effort put into ...
  • improving support where it exists
  • implementing support where it doesn’t
OpenSSH introduction

- Two main vendors - OpenSSH vs ssh.com
- Two protocol versions v1 vs v2
- Two OpenSSH trees - portable & BSD
OpenSSH beginnings

• Initially no Kerberos support
• Daniel Kouril added protocol v1 support
• ... but Heimdal only (used raw API)
• Informatics added MIT version
• Code easily accepted into the portable tree
OpenSSH - take 2

- Still no Kerberos support for protocol v2
- Jeff Hutzleman et al wrote an I-D
- 2 different mechanisms!
- Informatics implemented both of these for Kerberos + Von Welch contributed GSI
- Release early, release often ?? ...
The saga begins

- Specification had some bugs, which were found during implementation
- Implementation had some bugs, which were found through inter-op testing
- Specification had a nasty security issue, requiring protocol changes
- Upshot - lots (3) of incompatible versions!
The saga continues

• But why still a patch?
• Specification is now stable, and an RFC
• Many vendors ship with support
• “Why can’t I do GSSAPI key exchange with a stock OpenSSH?”
... and continues

- It's not easy to get code into OpenSSH
- kerberos-2@ssh.com
- code complexity
- feature complexity
- lack of understanding of enterprise requirements & politics!
OpenSSH Today

- User auth support is in the distribution
- ... but disabled by default
- Still no key exchange, and little chance of it
- What next?
Thunderbird

- Approach from lead developer to add Kerberos support
- Lots of support from Mozilla Foundation throughout
Thunderbird coding

- Existing library to integrate with GSSAPI
- Existing SASL support (DIGEST-MD5, etc.)
- Implementation had to be internal
- Extended GSSAPI interface to do SASL
  GSSAPI - available to all Mozilla based code
- Protocol specific code added for POP3, IMAP and SMTP
Thunderbird downsides

- No security layers
- Hey, they’re hard - have to wrap every IO call
- TLS makes this a little easier...
- Assumptions in existing code that you’ll only ever need 1 round trip
Thunderbird binaries

- Don’t want run-time dependencies
- So, dynamically load GSSAPI library
- Vital for Windows (SSPI vs KfW)
- Removes client library dependence
- Also simplifies build issues
- But, you don’t always get what you want!
GSSAPI imposters

- NFSv4 libgssapi doesn’t play nicely with the other children!
  - Incomplete API implementation
  - Calls exit when misconfigured
- Makes users sad
- ... and developers request code removal
If your name’s not on the list ...

- Thunderbird lists ‘good’ gssapi libraries
- ... but NFSv4 library shares a revision with Heimdal’s library
- ... so, check for symbols in the library
- The things we do to get in the default build!
• Consider a whole set of applications now
• Protocol uses SASL for authentication
• Not one Open Source application offers Kerberos/GSSAPI authentication
Requirement dangers

- XMPP RFCS require DIGEST-MD5 and PLAIN
- Cyrus SASL considered over complex
- Everyone rolled their own!
- Can’t add new mechanisms by throwing a switch
Jabberd2

- Ripped out existing SASL library - scod
- Replaced it with Cyrus SASL
- Implementation tricky, but now in CVS for 2.1
- Easy to get code accepted, but project may be stagnating
Gaim

- If a thing's worth doing it's worth doing twice ...
Gaim - round 1

- First implementation Cyrus SASL based
- Replaces existing code with Cyrus calls
- In CVS for 2.0
- No use on Windows or Mac OS X
- Can’t prompt for passwords
- Fallback hard to do neatly
Gaim - round 2

- Add internal GSSAPI SASL mechanism
- Works on Windows and Mac OS X
- Can prompt for passwords when required
- Still under development - see gaim-devel
Psiodb

• Development version uses Cyrus SASL
• But assumes ...
  • that every account will have a password!
  • that if one mech fails, they all will
Lessons - political

• Never underestimate the difficulty of getting your patch accepted
• Get lead developers onside early on
• But, it’s often difficult to convince them of the need for enterprise features
• Making Kerberos invisible to normal users is vital
Lessons - technical

• It’s not over once the code’s in
• Most developers build without your code
• Hardly anyone tests your code
Lessons - techical

• Avoid the raw Kerberos API
• Avoid implementing IDs in their early years
• Runtime loading is a double edged sword
• Using CyrusSASL is a good thing (on Linux)
Dangerous Assumptions

- Every mechanism only needs one round trip
- If one mechanism fails, they all will
- We’ll always need a password
- Security layers - what’s that?
Questions?

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... or catch me in the bar!